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Introduction 
A
s the world grapples with growing income disparities that leave more than three 
billion of the planet’s people in poverty, and as the current recession shrinks the 
pool of public and private resources available to remedy the situation, inves-
tors and policymakers across the globe are seeking high-impact, cost-effective 
strategies and tools to reduce the cavernous income and wealth gap and create bridges out 
of poverty.1
South Africa is a stark case in point. In 1994, when the country replaced apartheid with 
majority rule and elected Nelson Mandela president, South Africa was one of the most 
unequal nations on earth, with the preponderance of the country’s wealth concentrated in 
the hands of 9 percent of the population.2 Eighty-four percent of that wealth was deposited 
in the country’s four major banks, which by and large did not extend credit or most other 
banking services to blacks, who made up 80 percent of the population.3
That year, after the country transferred political power, but left economic power concen-
trated in the same minority hands, Shared Interest was launched to provide U.S. inves-
tors with a catalytic vehicle to help reverse apartheid’s legacy of institutionalized race-based 
inequality. In creating a model that would respond to South Africa’s particular conditions 
and needs, Shared Interest established a guarantee fund that moved highly capitalized South 
African banks to lend to community development financial institutions (CDFIs), coopera-
tives, and emerging enterprises that, in turn, have supplied credit, affordable homes, and jobs 
to more than one million low-income black (including mixed race) South Africans. In the 
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How Shared Interest Works 
Shared Interest’s fund guarantees South African bank loans to low-income black entre-
preneurs, cooperatives, and the CDFIs (including microfinance institutions) that serve their 
communities.
Individuals  and  institutions  (ranging  from  foundations  to  religious  orders)  currently 
invest between $3,000 and $1.5 million in Shared Interest for between three and five years, 
earning a rate of return that closely tracks that of U.S. Treasury notes. (Through an arrange-
ment with MicroPlace, retail investors in most states can also lend as little as $20 online.) 
Shared Interest invests the funds it borrows from its investors in quality debt securities, 
primarily U.S. government Notes, which it deposits in a U.S. bank. The bank in turn uses 
these securities to back letters of credit to mainstream South African financial institutions. 
The letters of credit secure loans to South Africa’s black entrepreneurial poor through CDFIs, 
cooperatives, and their own small and growing businesses. Through Shared Interest, U.S. 
investors become the functional cosigners for emerging entrepreneurs who would otherwise 
be considered “unbankable.”
But they are doing much more. Because Shared Interest guarantees no more than 75 
percent of any bank loan (and often covers less), it moves financial institutions to begin to 
underwrite and take their own risk in the majority market. Having brokered and guaranteed 
these new relationships, Shared Interest’s objective over time is to reduce its coverage and 
ultimately withdraw from particular transactions, leaving banks and their new borrowers 
working together, as a matter of ordinary business.
As Shared Interest puts the securities it purchases to work, it manages default risk through 
its South African partner organization, the Thembani International Guarantee Fund, which it 
established with RAFAD, a Swiss nongovernmental organization (NGO), in 1995.4 Themba-
ni’s wholly South African staff readies credit-worthy CDFIs, co-ops, and emerging enterprises 
to prepare their paperwork, apply for, and then negotiate what is usually their first commercial 
loan. With the added value of the guarantees it can provide, Thembani is also able to serve as 
a facilitator for its clients, brokering loans, and encouraging banks to lend at more favorable 
rates and terms than they would otherwise. Historically, Thembani has been able to lower 
interest rates to 1.5 percent above or below prime—the banks’ rate for their best customers.
Once the loan proposals are submitted, Thembani frequently confers with the banks 
during the underwriting process and assists the borrowers in complying with the banks’ and 
Thembani’s reporting and other monitoring requirements once the loans are made. Finally, 
Thembani also serves as a trainer for bank lending officers, either by assisting them on a case-
by-case basis throughout the transaction or, more recently, conducting classes to help them 
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Thembani also regularly monitors the risk of the outstanding guarantees and reports 
quarterly to its Credit Committee and to Shared Interest on the risk of the portfolio. This 
enables Shared Interest to assess the level of reserves to set aside in its Guarantee Loss Reserve 
Fund (GLRF) (built with its own net assets and donor capital) to protect its investors’ capital 
from potential loss. Shared Interest’s additional layer of subordinated debt and other credit 
enhancements includes a $3 million facility from the Overseas Private Investment Corpora-
tion (OPIC) to cushion lenders’ capital from loss in the event that defaults on guaranteed 
loans in South Africa cause South African banks to call on Shared Interest’s underlying secu-
rities and deplete its GLRF. Thembani’s Credit Committee, which approves new initiatives, 
can only authorize the issuance of guarantees if sufficient reserves are available to cover any 
projected risk. (Shared Interest representatives must approve the guarantee issued with its 
capital.) Shared Interest pays Thembani to place and negotiate the guarantees and to provide 
the necessary technical support and monitoring.
At the same time as Thembani’s hands-on assistance and the GLRF help to mitigate 
the risk that South African borrowers will default on their loans, the guarantee fund itself 
reduces currency risk. Shared Interest borrows in dollars, reinvests investors’ funds in dollar-
denominated securities, and uses these securities to back letters of credit issued in South 
African rand. It does not re-lend its funds to institutions operating in other currencies. 
Shared Interest only incurs currency risk in the event that loan defaults result in calls on its 
guarantees in South Africa. Should the rand appreciate against the dollar after the guarantee 
is issued, Shared Interest must supply more dollars than originally anticipated to cover the 
call. Shared Interest protects against such possibilities by using no more than 75 percent of 
its guarantee capital at any one time. Moreover, it invests its GLRF in rand-denominated 
securities so that the value of its reserves will rise and fall with the value of its guarantees.
Additional Models 
Shared Interest’s is not the only loan guarantee fund. In the United States, one of the 
oldest and best known models providing opportunities for retail investors is ACCION Inter-
national’s Bridge Fund, which extends facilities to institutions in the ACCION network.5 
Other development institutions, such as Grameen Foundation, use guarantees to enhance 
leverage and reduce credit risk for their own subsidiaries and network members. 
Other models include large portfolio guarantees (such as those by USAID, which help to 
secure portfolios of loans issued by particular banks). They also include multi-country funds, 
such as the International Guarantee Fund (FIG), which manages the guarantee portfolio of 
the Swiss NGO RAFAD and operates with capital largely supplied by its member institutions 
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Another guarantee model, pioneered by MicroCredit Enterprises (MCE), uses pledges 
of investors’ assets (without actually borrowing them) as guarantees to back loans issued by 
US banks to MCE which, in turn, lends the money to MFIs around the world (www.mcen-
terprises.org). In the event of a call, investors pay their proportional share of their losses to 
MCE as tax-deductible contributions.
The  increasing  international  interest  in  guarantees  reflects  growing  recognition  that, 
when properly financed, managed, and supported by local know-how, such vehicles play an 
important and unique role in development finance. Leveraging local resources, guarantees 
can boost the sustainability and scale of CDFIs and emerging enterprises, mitigate risk, and 
link new borrowers to their own countries’ commercial capital.
Multisector Approach 
Numerous guarantee funds and other development finance vehicles specialize in one 
sector, such as microfinance or Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), also referred to as 
“small and growing businesses” (SGBs). However, from the outset, Shared Interest noted that 
apartheid created deep craters of poverty in a number of ways, ranging from forcibly relo-
cating black families to the country’s least productive land or ethnically designated “home-
lands,” to concentrating industry in white areas, forcing rural blacks in search of jobs to 
migrate to townships on the outskirts of cities. In response, Shared Interest—recognizing that 
South Africa’s diverse communities were already implementing a broad spectrum of effective 
strategies to create wealth and jobs, sustainable rural livelihoods and affordable housing—
decided to support and learn from them by taking a multisector approach. 
Microfinance institutions, small black-owned enterprises (which were illegal outside of 
the “homelands” during apartheid), and new black-owned cooperatives face a common 
barrier: access to capital and the capacity to put it to productive use. Cognizant of South 
Africa’s  numerous  development  needs  and  approaches,  Shared  Interest  and  Thembani 
together devised different development strategies to address poverty in rural, periurban, and 
urban areas. The partner organizations work to continue to unlock capital for low-income 
communities in three main sectors: microfinance, rural SGBs, and affordable housing. They 
also work with innovative institutions to bridge boundaries between sectors. 
For example, two of Shared Interest’s microfinance institution (MFI) beneficiaries make 
credit available for low-cost housing. The first, Kuyasa, promotes individual and group saving 
and lending to enable low-income (primarily township) families to build, expand, or improve 
their homes. The second MFI, Norufin, issues loans for housing construction and improve-
ment to the residents of traditional communities that, by law, cannot put up communally 
owned land as collateral. Banks otherwise unwilling to lend to such rural homeowners have 
extended credit to the CDFI, which lends to current and future homeowners, with a Shared 
Interest guarantee.
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Impact 
By the end of 2010, the 41 guarantees that Shared Interest has issued have benefited 
1,994,546 low-income, black South Africans. The finances have reached residents in each 
of the country’s nine provinces. The financial leverage achieved by Shared Interest’s guar-
antee model has helped millions more. Since its inception, Shared Interest guarantees have 
enabled more than 99,699 economically disenfranchised South Africans to launch or expand 
small and microenterprises; 120,223 to build or improve affordable homes; and 1,774,381 to 
obtain jobs.6 Shared Interest’s guarantees have ranged in size from $18,124 to $1,516,320. 
Their leverage has varied from a $17,189, guarantee resulting in loans of $32,740 to a $711,631 
guarantee unlocking $66,000,000 in credit. 
Together, Shared Interest’s guarantees, totaling $14,938,657, have leveraged $94,504,524 
in loans to organizations benefiting South Africa’s entrepreneurial poor. That is, every dollar 
of guarantees issued has directly unlocked more than six dollars in credit. Moreover—and 
of particular interest today—during its 17 years of operation, Shared Interest has repaid all 
investors requesting repayment 100 percent of their principal and interest on time. Only six 
calls on its guarantees have been made as a result of full or partial borrower defaults in South 
Africa. However, owing to Shared Interest’s risk mitigation and guarantee loss reserves, no 
investor has lost a penny of interest or principal.
Examples
Several exemplars showcase the benefits of guarantees as a catalyst for development. The 
Small Enterprise Foundation (SEF), one of South Africa’s premiere microfinance institu-
tions, is one. An early Shared Interest’s client, SEF mobilizes savings and extends micro-
loans (often beginning at less than $100 each) to women in groups of five who use them to 
launch or expand tiny businesses in the provinces of Limpopo, Mpumalanga, Gauteng and 
the Eastern Cape. During the early 2000s, SEF was unable to obtain a loan from Standard 
Bank, where it had kept its accounts for 12 years, or any other commercial bank. Seeking to 
diversify its sources of capital and scale up, SEF obtained a series of guarantees from Shared 
Interest. Over a six-year period, SEF used $1,854,397 in guarantees to unlock $2,601,752 in 
commercial credit from the Amalgamated Banks of South Africa (ABSA), one of the coun-
try’s largest, and Teba (now renamed U-Bank), a second-tier bank that is half-owned by South 
Africa’s National Union of Mineworkers. This leverage helped SEF expand from 22,110 
clients to 68,578, while maintaining its borrowers’ 99 percent repayment rate. 
Most  important,  the  loans  to  SEF  built  the  physical  capital  of  rural  communities; 
enhanced social capital by helping to strengthen the survival, social cohesion, and organi-
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their families’ well-being. A study of eight SEF village centers found that “among direct 
programme  recipients,  [the]  12  month  experience  of  physical  and/or  sexual  abuse  was 
reduced by 55 percent.”7
Shared Interest issued another guarantee to Siboshwa, a sugarcane cooperative in eastern 
Mpumalanga, three miles from the Mozambican border. Siboshwa’s workers were forcibly 
removed from an area declared a “black spot” during apartheid, and trucked to inhospitable, 
undeveloped land, before the authorities shot their cattle. After apartheid, the democratically 
elected government gave Siboshwa initial financing and helped them form a cooperative, 
while TechnoServe provided technical assistance in growing cane, managing the business, 
and securing markets. Shared Interest provided an $80,496 guarantee, which unlocked a 
$107,328 loan from ABSA. This enabled the cooperative to expand its acres under cultiva-
tion, increase its yield, and prepare it for financial sustainability. 
Key Features 
The power of the guarantee model created by Shared Interest is enhanced by several 
factors, including its ability to leverage local capital, strengthen the capacity of local CDFIs 
and small black-owned enterprises, and alter banking practices and attitudes. We consider 
each of those factors below.
Leveraging Local Capital 
In the wake of the 2008 global recession and the G-20’s call for nations to reduce deficits 
by 50 percent by 2013, the role has only grown for development strategies that do not sink 
governments deeper into debt or exacerbate cross-border exposure.8 Since the 1980s, many 
nations’ debt traps have undermined their development efforts, as creditors such as the IMF 
and the World Bank have imposed rigorous “structural adjustment” (and “enhanced struc-
tural adjustment”) and mandated austerity measures in exchange for debt forgiveness and/or 
access to future international investment. As a result, there is a growing interest in strategies 
that avoid ongoing dependency on overseas investors and markets, and instead elicit local 
private-sector participation to mobilize local capital for development. 
Shared Interest’s guarantee fund leverages local capital in several ways. First, it encour-
ages mainstream South African financial institutions to extend credit to clients previously 
considered unbankable and to lend at least 33 percent more than the amount of the guar-
antee. (Over the years, guarantees have ranged from 19 percent to 75 percent, resulting in the 
extension of local loans at 1.3 to 6 times their value.) Second, CDFIs that receive commercial 
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lenders like CDFIs to deploy the same funds more than once a year by relending the prin-
cipal when loans are repaid. Many microfinance institutions make use of four-month repay-
ment periods, which allows the institutions to recycle the funds to those businesses three 
times a year. The result is that local partners’ capital and institutional support revolves funds 
and multiplies the value of the guarantees up to 12 times for microfinance institutions over 
a three-year period. (The bank lends 1.3 times the amount guaranteed, which revolves three 
times a year over a three-year period.)
 
Strengthening the Financial Skills of CDFIs and Emerging Black Enterprises
Shared Interest’s guarantees enable CDFIs and emerging enterprises to receive, use, and 
repay loans they need to grow, reach more clients, achieve economies of scale, and become 
increasingly sustainable. Thembani’s guidance and technical support throughout the process 
build skills in using financial tools such as guarantees for commercial expansion loans and 
help to enhance efficiencies and lessen dependency on grants.
When  guarantee  beneficiaries  require  assistance  related  to  their  particular  industries, 
technologies, and markets, Thembani and Shared Interest often partner with specialized 
service providers. In the Western Cape, for example, Thembani worked closely with Stel-
lenbosch University’s aquaculture department to assist the Hands-On Fish Farming Coop-
erative (HOFFC). With the university’s innovative trout farming methods and feed, and 
Shared Interest’s guarantees, HOFFC enabled black farmworkers to launch a successful trout 
farming cooperative consisting of 35 projects on the white-owned farms where they live 
and work. In Mpumalanga Province, Thembani has partnered with TechnoServe to enhance 
the agricultural and management expertise of two sugar cane cooperatives that were able to 
borrow working capital with the help of Shared Interest guarantees.
The guarantees are designed to move borrowers to access commercial loans without guar-
antees. After utilizing Shared Interest guarantees for six years, growing and strengthening 
its balance sheet, SEF obtained its first unsecured loan from Standard Bank (the bank with 
which it has maintained an account for 18 years). After only one guarantee, the Siboshwa 
sugar cane cooperative was able to obtain a loan from TSB, the local sugar industry’s largest 
financier, without a guarantee.
Finally, guarantees can be instrumental in bolstering financial intermediaries that build 
both social and financial capital. Guarantees to MFIs that use group or “solidarity” loans 
for development, for example, help to strengthen support systems that mobilize community 
members to back one another’s loans and benefit their communities in additional ways. This 
system has enabled Tropical Mushrooms, a mushroom farming business in North West Prov-
ince, to double its growing area, boost annual sales from R5.9 to R10.0 million, increase its 
workforce from 65 to 105, and create jobs to employ and encourage the careers of local youth.
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Altering Banking Practices and Attitudes 
More than unlocking credit for impoverished people and helping them build strong 
CDFIs, Shared Interest set out to promote institutional and attitudinal change to redress 
historical inequities in the banking system. It is far too soon to declare success with an effort 
that may take more than a generation. Nonetheless, the fact that Shared Interest has issued 
41 guarantees and moved at least some bankers to lend to clients previously considered 
unbankable demonstrates the potential of the approach. Moreover, an evaluation conducted 
by the New School for Social Research in 2005 found that banks using Shared Interest guar-
antees demonstrated increased willingness to lend to emerging entrepreneurs and, over time, 
to consider taking a greater share of the risk.9 
While the financial risk coverage serves as a catalyst for credit, Thembani’s hands-on 
technical support fosters new capacity and policies. By sharing its own due diligence with 
mainstream financial institutions, Thembani assists the lenders in underwriting loans to the 
new market. In addition, during the fall of 2009, ABSA hired Thembani staff to help train 
150 of its loan officers. 
Such support continues throughout the life of the guarantee, particularly if credit issues 
arise that the bank and its guarantors must address together. When several small businesses 
encountered difficulties during the recession of 2008 and 2009, Thembani collaborated 
with the banks to avert liquidation and work out solutions to business challenges, including 
providing specialized consultants and identifying potential equity partners. 
Challenges 
Shared Interest’s guarantee model faces several significant challenges to its success and 
growth. We outline the most prominent below. 
Legacies of Apartheid Banking 
Two  key  features  of  banking  during  the  apartheid  era  continue  to  challenge  South 
African financial institutions seeking to serve the majority market, even with internationally 
provided guarantees. The country’s international financial isolation in the 1980s and 1990s 
curtailed bankers’ interactions with international markets, and reduced their familiarity with 
mechanisms such as international letters of credit.10 Meanwhile, deeply rooted discrimina-
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underwriting criteria, credit policies, and attitudes. Black entrepreneurs and communities 
were typically not perceived as “credit-worthy,” particularly when they lacked traditional 
forms of collateral difficult for impoverished families to obtain, and had no formal borrowing 
histories, creating a vicious cycle of exclusion from credit. 
Apartheid practices and perspectives further limited experience with community lending, 
which continues to undermine mainstream lenders’ capacity to serve the low-income black 
majority. During the last five years, for example, Shared Interest has found that even banks 
with decades of experience lending to white-owned sugarcane cooperatives are reluctant to 
lend to black-owned sugarcane cooperatives, even those with solid financial records. Simi-
larly, the banks are much faster to foreclose on black farmers in trouble than on similarly 
situated white farmers, who are more likely to be given time to work things out. By shut-
ting down black-owned businesses, this disturbing pattern undoes the potential for positive 
community outcomes. Worse, it establishes negative precedents and expectations that black-
owned businesses are likely to fail and are unworthy of credit. 
Borrowers’ Reluctance and Limited Capacity to Use Commercial Credit
A second challenge to continued growth is the fact that access to commercial credit 
is new for many in South Africa, and elsewhere. South Africa’s CDFIs, cooperatives, and 
emerging enterprises have had little experience with formal-sector financial institutions, and 
are often reluctant and unprepared to seek commercial credit on their own. They require 
Thembani’s technical and often moral support in applying for and negotiating loans from 
banks that have rejected them in the past—if they have the courage and opportunity to 
approach them at all.
Meanwhile, many of the newer emerging enterprises and agricultural cooperatives that 
have sought Shared Interest’s assistance have required extensive work with technical partners 
to prepare them to put commercial credit to work. The HOFFC, for example, would not 
be bankable today without the strong technical support of the University of Stellenbosch’s 
aquaculture department. Similarly, the Siboshwa cooperative would have been unable to 
launch or manage its profitable sugarcane business without TechnoServe’s expertise in crop 
production,  management,  and  marketing.  This  inexperience  and  continued  reliance  on 
outside advice can place significant demand on supporting organizations. It elevates the time 
and expense of providing these services, which are critical for bringing banks and emerging 
entrepreneurs and communities together to “make the market.” This means that at least 
during the short- and medium-term, intermediaries like Shared Interest and Thembani that 
provide technical assistance to new market entrants are unlikely to be able to cover the cost 
of their non-financial services with revenues earned from their guarantee funds. As a result, 
for the foreseeable future, they are likely to require fees from those clients who can afford 
them pay for them—and subsidies for those who cannot.
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Sustainability and Scale 
To succeed and grow, development finance organizations such as Shared Interest require 
a firm foundation of “equity” or net assets. Yet building this equity is not easy if the institu-
tion is not well capitalized at the outset and must scale up loan by loan, grant by grant. For 
these organizations, long-term and major support is often needed to ensure their staying 
power and anchor their growth.11 Yet such support is often very difficult to find. With limited 
equity or net assets, such organizations may experience difficulty in obtaining loans from 
larger and more mainstream investors which, in turn, is an important step toward protecting 
the funds they borrow and increasing their scale of operations. 
Building the guarantee portfolio is further challenged by the interest Shared Interest is 
able to pay its lenders. The rates are capped by the gross interest the organization earns on 
its investments in high-quality but low-return securities (particularly in the current market). 
Consequently, it is not yet possible for Shared Interest to pay investors an entirely risk-
adjusted return. Moreover, the lack of a market for Shared Interest notes presents an obstacle 
for those mainstream investors seeking enhanced liquidity, and a constraint on the organiza-
tion’s potential growth.
Replicability
Going to scale with any successful venture can be difficult. As Shared Interest prepares to 
scale up and extend its work to other countries in Southern Africa, it confronts several obsta-
cles. The first is that guarantees presuppose a sufficiently developed banking system that is 
capable of extending loans and working with international letters of credit. Unfortunately, a 
number of countries in the region still lack such a robust system. This means that guarantees 
for developmental domestic bank lending may take more time and work to establish, and are 
likely to be less supported by sound credit policies and lending practices.
The second obstacle is the frequent lack of a political and regulatory environment condu-
cive to these kinds of development initiatives. South Africa is moving in the direction of 
fostering such an environment. Even though it lacks legislation resembling the U.S. Commu-
nity Reinvestment Act, South Africa has made reducing inequality a priority and has estab-
lished  a  series  of  industry-specific  black  economic  empowerment  charters,  including  the 
Financial Sector Charter (FSC). The FSC sets benchmarks for banks and a reporting system 
to hold them publicly accountable. Although momentum for the FSC progress has slowed 
during the past two years, it has had a significant impact by ensuring that the industry sets, 
and in most cases exceeds, transformation benchmarks, including lending to low-income black 
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to the majority market, and its impact has varied within the context of other political pres-
sures, it has provided strong incentives that do not exist in many other emerging economies. 
Without even these legal measures, there may be less incentive for banks in other countries 
to overcome their own barriers and inertia, and to extend credit to underserved communities.
Myopia about Microfinance
The  buzz  surrounding  microfinance  risks  diverting  attention  from  its  original  aims. 
Recently, the discovery by international capital markets that microfinance can be extremely 
lucrative has created both momentum and confusion. It has also contributed to over-concen-
tration, escalating interest rates and defaults in some markets. While impressive microfinance 
returns have driven $30 billion into the sector, they have also blurred the boundaries of a 
field whose original focus was developmental. In some countries, South Africa included, the 
term “microfinance” now applies to institutions such as “reckless lenders,” “payday lenders” 
and “loan sharks” that the government is attempting to regulate in the interest of consumers. 
Such inclusive terminology has blurred the perceptual lines between the categories and their 
basic purposes.
Moreover, by focusing investment on the more profitable microfinance institutions—
primarily those top-tier MFIs already operating at substantial scale and equipped to connect 
to capital markets—the field is contributing to its own concentration in a subset of MFIs that 
compete with each other in some saturated markets, as numerous investors compete to invest 
in the same established MFIs. Such concentration exerts pressures on MFIs to raise their 
interest rates and grow quickly to meet the return expectations of investors. In the process 
they fuel client over-indebtedness and, in countries like India, have contributed to a backlash 
of consumers refusing to repay their loans.
At the same time, such top-tier MFI investment concentration is failing to support the 
growth of smaller and younger developmental MFIs that need capital to mature and enhance 
their self-sufficiency.13 Failing to seed the next generation of MFIs is short-sighted on the 
part of the investment community. Investors totally driven by profit are failing to expand the 
field to serve the estimated 270 million impoverished people still waiting for credit, as well as 
to meet MFI investors’ own need for new investment opportunities.14 The trend challenges 
Shared Interest to distinguish its own work with smaller institutions and its particular devel-
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Government Policy
Policy tools that spur international lending to combat poverty are scarce. In the United 
States, several policy initiatives create incentives for domestic financial institutions to supply 
loans and grants to low-income communities. The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), 
where enforced, can penalize those that do not do so. Further, the Obama administra-
tion recently approved the largest funding allocation to the CDFI Fund in its history. The 
fund channels government grants directly to CDFIs. However, in the international arena, 
no legislation provides incentives for the private sector and nonprofit financial interme-
diaries to combat global poverty by advancing international community lending.15 With 
the exception of grants through USAID, and OPIC, U.S. policy has yet to reward bank 
and corporate support for organizations that unlock private-sector finance for low-income 
communities overseas, in the way that CRA-motivated banks and CDFIs are doing at home. 
While U.S. policymakers articulate commitments to reducing poverty, and stabilizing and 
building markets overseas, their available remedies are also constrained by the volume of 
tax-levy dollars available to donate to international development initiatives. In this context, 
the government could do more to mobilize and reward private-sector loans and contribu-
tions to intermediaries fostering public-private partnerships and investment in disadvan-
taged communities overseas. This would be a cost-effective tool to enhance the success and 
leverage the results of its other international development strategies.
Lessons Learned 
We can mine Shared Interest’s 17 years of experience for a variety of lessons for making 
capital more accessible to low-income people and the small and micro-enterprises they 
establish and run. The first lesson is the most humbling: there is no silver bullet for eradi-
cating poverty. Unlocking the power and potential of marginalized communities will require 
multiple strategies and partnerships. Shared Interest’s work with MFIs, cooperatives, and 
other emerging enterprises has helped to leverage financial and human capital for a range 
of complementary approaches to combating poverty. Nonetheless, many other public- and 
private-sector initiatives are required to reverse centuries of exploitation and build a more 
equitable economy. 
Mobilizing Local Capital 
Despite the enormity of the task, eradicating poverty is not impossible, and mobilizing 
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international agencies will, and must, continue to invest their own funds, often in their 
own currencies, in development across the globe. However, it is also essential that emerging 
communities and nations themselves raise local capital and invest it in their own develop-
ment. Clearly, guarantee funds are one mechanism to mobilize local currency resources for 
these purposes. The guarantees also reduce currency risk to both local beneficiaries and inter-
national investors. As noted, Shared Interest and Thembani plan to secure capital to back 
guarantees from South African investors, a move that will further leverage U.S. resources 
and enable Thembani to finance its own guarantees. The devastating lessons of dependency, 
distorted development, and structural adjustment have been driven home again. The recent 
international financial debacle planted a new red flag signaling the dangers of the kind of 
development that “giveth and taketh away.”
Local Partners 
Local partners are another local resource that is critical to sustained success. Indeed, an 
important lesson that Shared Interest has learned in the process of seeding development is 
the invaluable role that these local partners play in a range of functions. Shared Interest’s 
ability to place quality guarantees, monitor and mitigate risk, measure impact, and build the 
skills and relationships of beneficiaries and banks would not be possible without a strong 
local partner. In this case, Thembani ensures that Shared Interest’s investors’ capital achieves 
its intended purpose with a minimum of risk, while building the field of development finance 
in South Africa. As Thembani collaborates in turn with additional technical assistance and 
mentoring organizations in South Africa, it further roots the work in local knowledge and 
institutions, and helps local institutions learn from each other’s experiences. These mecha-
nisms are essential not only to implementation and mitigating risk, but to ensuring that 
development becomes a tool of the communities it seeks to serve.
Social Capital
The elusive, but critical “social capital” is yet another element in the sustained success 
of development efforts.16 Social capital takes its name from financial capital, and its impor-
tance is on par with that of finance. But it is neither quantifiable like money nor measurable 
like poverty. Social capital is the glue that binds communities together—the networks that 
connect ideas and people; the trust that springs from working together; the nonmonetary 
aspects that make life easier for community members and increase their collective ability 
to accomplish their own goals. Indeed, building social capital is as important as leveraging 
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management systems and delivery models, and enhanced their scale, but have also enhanced 
their clients’ skills, social support systems, organization, and a belief in themselves. Ulti-
mately social capital can not only magnify the impact of development finance strategies 
such as group microfinance and loans for cooperatives, but also complement them with 
other strategies that enhance their beneficiaries’ ability to meet their basic needs. SEF clients, 
for example, have mobilized through their savings-and-borrowing village centers to reduce 
violence against women and other behavior that had threatened their safety and health, and 
to make community clinics more responsive to their members. In so doing they enhanced 
their communities’ interrelated physical and economic survival and well-being.
Systems Change: More Than Moving Money 
Financial models that use a systems approach can be particularly effective catalysts for 
social change. By impacting the behavior of major institutions (such as banks) and their 
relationships to other market participants (such as emerging entrepreneurs), development 
finance institutions can achieve far greater and more enduring results than those they could 
produce with their own resources and episodic interventions alone. Guarantee funds with a 
hands-on catalytic and capacity-building component can have a profound impact on private-
sector institutions and practices. Specifically they can help emerging nations mobilize their 
own institutions and resources to lay the foundations for increasingly equitable development 
on an ongoing basis. While it is much too early to declare “victory” in moving banks to 
lend to low-income communities, Shared Interest has demonstrated the credit-worthiness of 
many of its guarantee beneficiaries, and begun to move some bankers and banks to extend 
credit to borrowers they would have previously considered “unbankable.” 
Appeal of the Model 
What makes stakeholders invest in tools like guarantees? What is the appeal to investors 
of models such as Shared Interest’s? In reality, a number of factors motivate stakeholders, 
some tangible, some less so. Banks that use the guarantees in South Africa, for example, 
have enhanced their reputations as institutions contributing to “broad-based black economic 
empowerment” (BBBEE), a goal of the South African government and those who elected 
it. Loans to low-income black borrowers enhance a lending institution’s “scorecard,” the 
instrument that measures its social performance according to the standards of the country’s 
Financial Sector Charter. In this context, Shared Interest and Thembani help move banks to 
issue loans that benefit both their balance sheets and their public profile.17 
As banks move beyond their traditional comfort zones, they benefit from a low-risk 
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Interest’s guarantees and Thembani’s technical support, they not only mitigate their risk, 
they also enhance their understanding of the black, low-income market, as well as their skills 
in underwriting and monitoring loans to CDFIs and emerging entrepreneurs. 
Shared Interest’s investors, in turn, are motivated by the high social return on their 
investment. Many are driven by their commitment to help South Africans build an equitable 
economy after apartheid. Others value the financial leverage of the guarantee model and 
its ability to mobilize local capital for the country’s unbanked majority, and particularly its 
women. While financial returns have tended to be lower than those of corporate and govern-
ment fixed-income securities (with the exception of years such as 2009 and 2010, when U.S. 
government Treasury and Agency interest rates plummeted), they are commensurate with 
those of many other community investments. 
In addition, investing in Shared Interest (and other CDFIs) provides a hedge against 
movements of a market with which it is only tangentially correlated. Because Shared Inter-
est’s operations do not depend on mainstream financial markets, the organization provides 
an  opportunity  for  portfolio  diversification.  At  the  same  time,  it  strengthens  the  most 
powerful economy on the African continent—an engine for growth badly needed as U.S. and 
European economies falter.18
Shared Interest’s investors and donors, in addition to placing high priority on the social 
return on their contributions, are compelled by the knowledge that they are building an 
increasingly sustainable institution that is enhancing the capacity of South African entre-
preneurs, families, and communities to support themselves. They are further motivated to 
support Shared Interest’s strategy to alter South Africa’s financial ecosystem—by moving banks 
to lend to their country’s own majority market—ultimately without the support of guarantees. 
Finally they support Shared Interest’s current strategy to expand its operations to reach the 
next 500,000 black South Africans, and to ensure its own sustainability and that of Thembani 
for the long haul. 
Conclusion 
Although South Africa is exceptional, in many ways it is not an exception. Discrimina-
tory lending practices are not unique to South Africa. They have been entrenched across the 
globe, leaving diverse and exploited populations struggling to direct their own development. 
Such lending practices are more the norm than the exception. South Africa is like many 
other countries with histories of colonial rule, economic exploitation and institutionalized 
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Guarantees have an important role to play in building a new financial ecosystem that 
reduces economic disparities, roots development finance in emerging communities, and 
moves them forward on their own developmental paths, while providing a role for interna-
tional partners without creating detrimental dependency. As Shared Interest works to further 
test and develop its model, and explores opportunities to extend its work beyond South 
Africa, it is looking to other countries in Southern Africa. With sufficient public and private 
support at home and abroad, its model can be replicated well beyond the region.
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